WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND RELIGION - THE MISSING
ELEMENT IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
COCHAV ELKAYAM-LEVY*
INTRODUCTION

"Wearing the headscarf is considered ... to be synonymous
with the alienation of women. The ban on wearing the
headscarf is therefore seen as promoting equality between
men and women. However, what, in fact, is the connection between the ban and sexual equality? The judgment
does not say.
... What is lacking in this debate is the opinion of women, both those who wear the headscarf and those who
choose not to."
Judge Tulkens of the European Court of Human Rights'
Many countries have recently experienced vibrant and heated
internal discussions on religion and state issues. The nature of these issues tends to be exceptionally poignant, touching the very essence of peoples' private beliefs and generally generating intense
social and political tensions. One of the most controversial debates
involves the tension between women's equality and religious freedom. A rigorous expression of it takes place in the European context, much of it surrounding the wearing of veils, headscarves, and
other modest garments by Muslim women in the public sphere, all
* Cochav Elkayam-Levy is an S.J.D. Candidate in the University of Pennsylvania Law School and was previously a Penn Law Human Rights Scholar. I
would like to thank Professor Sarah Barringer-Gordon and Professor Perry Dane
for their generous support, as well as Professor Ruth Halperin-Kaddari for being a
true source of inspiration.
1 Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 220, 11 [hereinafter Sahin] (Tulkens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The European Court of
Human Rights' Grand Chamber opinion gave rise to one dissent, authored by
Judge Tulkens from Belgium, one of the five female judges on the seventeen-judge
panel.

1175

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'1 L.

1176

[Vol. 35:4

of which are claimed to be manifestation of Muslim religious beliefs.
In recent years, many states across Europe have legislated prohibitions on wearing Islamic garments, 2 putting forward various
justifications such as: (a) preserving state secularism at the public
sphere, (b) ensuring state's religious neutrality, (c) promoting gender equality (as these garments are often seen as an oppressive
practice), (d) protecting the public order from the perceived threat
of radical political Islam, and (e) the need to protect school children
from religious influences.3
The debate over banning headscarves has spawned a vast Feminist literature laying out robust arguments of both opponents and
proponents of the bans. Both sides make many claims. On the one
hand, some introduce sharp criticism of European courts' decisions
to endorse the bans, claiming that the rulings violate women's
right to manifest their religion and other rights (such as the right to
personal autonomy, the right of access to education and the right
to employment).4 On the other hand, some assert that the secular
approach of the courts is vital for the protection and implementation of women's human rights and equality in democratic socie2

3

Mainly on Islamic headscarves in educational settings.
For an extensive overview of the European bans on religious garments see

ERICA HOWARD, LAW AND THE WEARING OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLs: EUROPEAN BANS ON
THE WEARING OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN EDUCATION 30 (2012) (exploring the arguments for and against the bans in the literature and in the case law of both the European Court of Human Rights and national courts across Europe on the topic);

see, e.g., Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis of
Headscarves, Religious Expression, and Women's Equality Under InternationalLaw, 45
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367 (2006-2007) (claiming that secularism is vital for the

implementation of women's human rights).
4 Id. In addition, as women were banned from wearing the headscarves at
work or at educational institutions, the bans were viewed as putting obstacles to
their participation in these places. See, e.g., Christine Chinkin, Women's Human
Rights and Religion: How Do they Co-Exist?, in RELIGION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF ISLAMIC STATE PRACTICES 53 (Javaid Rehman and Susan C. Breau eds., 2007) (examining "the tensions" arising
from claims regarding women's human rights and those rights pursued in "the
name of religion"); Carolyn Evans, The 'Islamic Scarf in the European Court of Human Rights, 7 MELB. J. INT'L L. 52 (2006) (discussing the European Court of Human
Rights' treatment of Muslim women "who were denied the right to wear headscarves"); Gila Stopler, Rights in Immigration: The Veil as a Test Case, 43 ISR. L. REV.
183, 183-85 (2010) (providing a brief account of immigration issues in Europe surrounding the Muslim community); Ghada Hashem Talhami, European, Muslim and
Female, 11 MIDDLE EAST POL'Y 152, 167 (2004) (positing that bans on veiling in Europe "fail to protect the rights of Muslim women to education and religious freedom").
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ties.5
Notably, this clash between gender equality principles and
freedom of religion is especially common in democratic states
where minorities constitute a significant part of the population and
are "of different religious persuasion[s] from that of the majority
population." 6 For this reason, many scholars have seen relevance
to the multicultural debate. In a nutshell, this is a debate on states'
recognition and respect of minority groups' traditions and the inevitable collision with democratic values. The issue raises questions of whether and how states should accommodate or set limits
to religious, cultural, ethical and other beliefs. The complexity
deepens as democratic countries protect conflicting ideals; for instance, freedom of religion and freedom to manifest one's religion
versus freedom from religion, secularism and gender equality.
Current scholarship struggles to settle these contrasting interests,
many times understood in general as the religious-secular conflict.7
It is in this context that I wish to discuss and explore the way in
which the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court)
has dismissed the claims of women who were denied the right to
wear headscarves in educational institutions or other public places.
The discussion revolves around three recent cases brought before
the ECtHR.8 This paper examines the Court's assessment in the
cases (Part 1), the feminists' arguments laid out to settle the conflict
5 See e.g., Bennoune, supra note 3, at 370-71 (arguing that the European Court
of Human Rights ruled correctly in its recent decisions, and introducing the focus
of the paper -the context that supports secularism regarding women's human
rights and religious expression).
6 Chinkin, supra note 4, at 56 (addressing the pressure placed on "women's
compliance" due to the religious persuasion of the community they're placed in,
specifically in Europe).
7 See, e.g., Chinkin, supra note 4 (discussing tension between women's rights
and religion); Michael M. Karayanni, Living in a Group of One's Own: Normative
Implications Related to the Private Nature of the Religious Accommodations for the Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 6 UCLA J. IsLAMIc & NEAR E. L. 1 (2006-2007) (exploring the "religious-secular conflict" in Israel); Gila Stopler, Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberties Tolerate Religious and Cultural Practices that
Discriminate Against Women, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 154, 155 (2003) (arguing
that religion and cultural norms serve as "justifications for discrimination on the
basis of sex," specifically against women); Donna J. Sullivan, Gender Equality and
Religious Freedom: Towards a Frameworkfor Conflict Resolution, 24 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. &
POL. 795, 795-804 (1991-1992) (offering framework for resolving conflicts between
women's human rights and freedom of religion).
8 See generally Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, 2001-V Eur. Ct.
H.R. 447 [hereinafter Dahlab]; Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(Apr. 3,2009) [hereinafter Dogru]; Sahin, supra note 1.
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between gender equality and women's religious liberties missing
in the rulings (Part 2), and finally, the questionable absence of
comprehensive legal analysis of these issues in the Court's judgments and its failure to fully engage with the complexity of the debate (Part 3).
More specifically, in Part 1 of this article, I provide the framework of the current legal debate in the ECtHR, describing the decisions and the legal analysis put forward by the Court. It also considers the contextual background in which these rulings were
issued, as it was brought by the Court, in an attempt to provide
due and comprehensive consideration to the matrix of factors underlying the decisions.9 In Part 2, I turn to explore women's voices,
which I consider as the missing element in the Court's decisions.
Feminist scholarship offered numerous arguments and theories to
reconcile the conflicting rights and find solutions addressing the
complexity of the debate on religious freedoms, gender equality,
and women's rights. In this article, I wish to unveil the considerations that should have been taken into account, at least in part, and
map the ways in which such considerations affect women's rights.
Finally, Part 3 confronts the Court's approach in these cases. I
claim that despite the extensive and heavy feminist arguments and
scholarship written in response to the bans spread around Europe
(which were upheld by European courts long before the ECtHR),
the Court failed to develop any substantial case law on women's
equality, human rights and religion or any methodology to tackle
these conflicts. Inspired by recent scholarship,o I argue that the
Court's approach stems from the current construction of religion as
9 For an extremely extensive contextual analysis, see Bennoune, supra note 3
(claiming that the ECtHR ruled correctly in its recent decisions and asserts that
secularism is vital for the implementation of women's human rights).
10 See David Kennedy, Images of Religion in Legal Theory, in RELIGION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 145 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., 1999) (discussing
the history of religion and international law); David Kennedy, Losing Faith in the
Secular: Law, Religion, and the Culture of International Governance, in RELIGION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 309, 313 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., 1999) (analyzing the possibility of religion "act[ing] as arm of the law" as secularism becomes
less apparent); Madhavi Sunder, Piercingthe Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1401-02, 1417
(2002-03) (describing religion as "the 'other' of international law"); see also Christina M. Cema & Jennifer C. Wallace, Women and Culture, in WOMEN AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 623 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds.,
1999) (detailing the discrimination of human rights women face due to culture);
Joan Scott, Symptomatic Politics: The Banning of Islamic Head Scarves in French Public
Schools, 23 FRENCH POL. CULTURE & Soc'y 106, 108 (2005) (discussing the oppression and treatment of women wearing headscarves).
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law's "other", i.e. as an extralegal field, irrational and incontestable
in the conventional sense." This construction is obstructing any
comprehensive judgment and discussion over religious issues and
human rights in the legal arena. In simple words, the law to fails
to properly handle religion, religious claims and religious aspirations in the public sphere. I claim that it is not only that religion is
constructed as law's other, but in the context of women's rights
and religion, the otherness is exacerbated. Legal demands involving religion and women's rights create a legal field so 'sensitive',
controversial and different from their norms that conflicts between
women's religious rights and the legal system is virtually unavoidable. With respect to the ECtHR, such a course of rulings is troubling and even dangerous, particularly in light of the wide effect of
the ECtHR judgments on national courts, as well as on international human rights tribunals and institutions. 12
1.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. Religious Freedoms in the European Human Rights Convention
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is enshrined in the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms under Article 9.13 The requirements set out in Article 9 of the European Convention, to which all European States
are parties, set the framework for the arguments in this debate.
Article 9(1) provides that:
9.1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes . .. freedom, either

alone or in community with others and in public or private,
to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, prac-

11 Sunder, supra note 10, at 1401-02, 1417-25 (detailing the treatment of religion as law's "other" and the transition of its construction).
12 Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards,
31 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 843, 843 (1998-1999) (examining the effect of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation on the "protection and promotion of human
rights.").
13 European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter European Convention]. For similar analysis of the convention provisions and the ECtHR cases, see Evans, supra note 4 (criticizing the ECtHR's reliance on stereotypes and generalizations about Muslim women).
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tice and observance.14
Article 9 distinguishes between two aspects of religious freedom: (a) the right to freedom of religion, which is considered absolute as it encompasses the right to have or not to have a religion,
and cannot be subject to limitations; and (b) the freedom to manfest
one's religion, which is the external dimension of the freedom of
religion allowing for the exercise of religion. 5
Yet, the Convention does not protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief. Specifically, Article 9(2) subjects the
manifestation of religion or belief "only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interest of public safety, for the protection of public order, health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."16 These limitations are set in light of the concern that the public manifestation of religion can potentially interfere with the rights
of others or otherwise stand in contrast to state laws (as was the
exercise of wearing of the Islamic headscarves perceived by some
states).' 7
In its case law, the ECtHR emphasizes the pluralistic aspect of
religious freedom, stressing that it is fundamental to a "democratic
society," and though it is "one of the most vital elements that go to
make up the identity of believers," it is also "a precious asset for
atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned." 8 Furthermore,
according to the Court, in democratic societies where several religions coexist, "it may be necessary to place restrictions on this
freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups
and ensure that everyone's beliefs are respected."19
Nevertheless, when a certain act or measure that is prescribed
by law and pursues a legitimate aim constitutes interference with
Id. at art. 9.
15 Claudia Morini, Secularism and Freedom of Religion: The Approach of the European Court of Human Rights, 43 IsR. L. REv. 611, 613 (2010) (focusing on the ECtHr's approach to issues regarding secularism, religion and the margin of appreciation doctrine).
16 European Convention, supra note 13, at art. 9(2).
17 Morini, supra note 15.
18 Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H.R., $ 31 (1993). In
the context of the case, the Court itself avoided taking sides, emphasizing the failure of the domestic court to apply the domestic law properly since it had not spelt
out sufficiently clearly how the applicant had committed the elements of the offense of improper proselytism. See generally id.
14

19 Id.

33.
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the right of a person to manifest her religion, the main question before the Court is whether or not such interference is "necessary in a
democratic society." 20 In this regard, the Court applies the Margin
of Appreciation doctrine, according to which "contracting States
have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing the existence
and extent of the need for interference." 21 In essence, this doctrine
provides for a certain legal notion that the national authorities are
best suited to decide how to fulfill their obligations under the European Convention.22 Moreover, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR's believes that "[w]here questions concerning the relationship
between State and religions are at stake, on which opinion in a
democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the role of the national decision-making body must be given special importance." 23
Subsequently, this approach creates a relatively wide margin of
discretion, where states are given very strong deference in cases
involving questions of religion and state. The Court however
holds that the "margin of appreciation goes hand in hand with a
Europeansupervision ....

The Court's task is to determine whether

the measures taken at national level were justified in principle and
proportionate . . . ."24

1.2. About Headscarves, Women and Rights in the ECtHR
Jurisprudence
Turning to the debated issue on women's rights and their religious freedoms, in three cases brought before it, the Court determined that the practice of wearing headscarves falls within the
scope of the right to manifest one's religion. 2s Yet, applying the
European Convention, supra note 16.
Dahlab, supra note 8, at 462.
22 Eyal Benvenisti, supra note 12, at 843 (citing HOWARD C. YOUROw, THE
20
21

MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS

JURISPRUDENCE (1996); Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the
Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 56 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L. L. 230,
240 (1996) (describing the lack of universal standards and the influence of nations
in deciding how to apply the European Convention).
23 Dogru, supra note 8, 1 63; Sahin, supra note 1, at T 109.
24 Sahin, supra note 1, 1110 (emphasis added).
25 See Dahlab, supra note 8, at 463 (noting that when "weighing the right of a
teacher to manifest her religion against the need to protect pupils by preserving
religious harmony, the Court considers that, in the circumstances of the case and
having regard, above all, to the tender age of the children for whom the applicant
was responsible as a representative of the State, the Geneva authorities did not
exceed their margin of appreciation and that the measure they took was therefore
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above tests, the ECtHR upheld the different bans and forbade the
wearing of the Islamic headscarf by Swiss elementary school teachers (Dahlab), Turkish university students (Sahin), and French school
girls (Dogru).26
Underlying the majority's approach to this question is the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine, promoted by the
notion that States are more suitable to reach these "internal" decisions on state and religion issues. 27 The ample margins led the
Court to accept the bans put forward by the states by acknowledging two main reasons for such dress regulations: secularism (or
state neutrality) and gender equality.
Characterizing the decisions is the very little discussion, if any
at all, on what constitutes these "women's rights," how the bans
are promoting gender equality, and in what manner women's
rights are being protected by restrictions on their religious dress.
The generality of the rulings shed light on the regrettable absence
of women's human rights analysis.
Another issue to notice is the "thin European Supervision" applied by the Court, as a consequence of the wide margins recognized. Judge Tulkens, in the Sahin case, referred to this issue and
said, "European supervision seems quite simply to be absent from
the judgment."28
In addition, important elements in the Court's rulings, also
linked to the width of the margin, include the appreciation granted
to the cultural, social and legal diversity, as well as the historical
background of each of the European countries when questions of
religion and state are being confronted (whether by governmental,
not unreasonable.").
26 See generally Dahlab, supra note 8; Sahin, supra note 1; Dogru, supra note
8.
27 See, e.g. Sahin, supra note 1,
109-10 ("Where questions concerning the
relationship between State and religions are at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the role of the national decisionmaking body must be given special importance .... Rules in this sphere will consequently vary from one country to another according to national traditions and
the requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others
and to maintain public order .... Accordingly, the choice of the extent and form
such regulations should take must inevitably be left up to a point to the State concerned, as it will depend on the specific domestic context."). See also Evans, supra
note 4, at 57 ("The margin of appreciation plays a role in deferring to the judgment
of states whose democratically elected officials are said to be in closed contact
with the particular needs of their populations.").
2 Sahin, supra note 1, 1 3 at 221.
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judicial or administrative authorities). The Court reiterated in this
regard that its role is not to impose uniformity or to strive for the
existence of this reality, but rather to take into consideration the
European diversity (in the sense that several countries establish religion and others strive for complete separation and secularism). 29
The next sections elaborate on these decisions and issues, and
particularly the lack of proper consideration to the principle of
gender equality and its conflict with women's religious freedoms
(which I consider as the missing element in the Court's assessment).
1.2.1. Dahlabv. Switzerland
In Dahlab v. Switzerland, the Court upheld a Swiss court decision prohibiting a primary-school teacher from covering herself
with a hijab in class.30 As described by the Court, shortly after she
was appointed as a teacher, and after a period of "spiritual soulsearching," the teacher converted to Islam and decided to wear an
Islamic headscarf.31 The Court described it as a religious practice
whereby women are "enjoined to draw their veils over themselves
in the presence of men and male adolescents." 32
Four years after her conversion, the school authorities requested that the teacher stop wearing the headscarf while carrying out
her professional duties in school.33 They argued that domestic
laws forbid the teacher's practice, stressing that the headscarf constitutes "an obvious means of identification imposed by a teacher

29

See, e.g. Sahin, supranote 1, T 109.

It is not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of
the significance of religion in society and the meaning or impact of the
public expression of a religious belief will differ according to time and
context. Rules in this sphere will consequently vary from one country to
another according to national traditions and the requirements imposed
by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others and to maintain
public order. Accordingly, the choice of the extent and form such regulations should take must inevitably be left up to a point to the State concerned, as it will depend on the specific domestic context.
30
See generally Dahlab, supra note 8. The hijab is the Arabic language term
used to refer to the headscarf worn by some Muslim women that covers their
head, hair, and neck.
31 Id. at 451.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 452 (citing a decision by the Directorate General for Primary Education).
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on her pupils, especially in a public, secular education system."34
The case was eventually appealed to the Swiss Federal Court.
As its decision was endorsed by the ECtHR, it is worth mentioning
a few parts of this opinion hearing at the Swiss Federal Court.35
First, in its review of the case, the Swiss Federal Court found Ms.
Dahlab's practice to be completely at odds with domestic laws and
judged that her wearing of the Islamic scarf was against "the principle of denominational neutrality in schools, a principle that seeks
both to protect the religious beliefs of pupils and parents and to
ensure religious harmony." 36 It further stated that "schools would
be in danger of becoming places of religious conflict if teachers
were allowed to manifest their religious beliefs through their conduct and, in particular, their clothing.. . ."
Second, the Swiss Court dismissed Ms. Dahlab's argument that
no law explicitly prohibits the wearing of religious clothing, and
held that conduct that "would be regarded by the average citizen
as being of minor importance" does not require a law "too precise." 38 Nevertheless, it does not identify the "average citizen" including on its gender, religious beliefs, culture, belonging to a minority group or any other affiliation that can be of relevance. 39
Third, the Swiss Court concluded its decision by pointing out
the risk to the pupils of the possibility of the teacher's proselytizing
her religion by wearing such a "powerful religious symbol."40 Furthermore, it emphasized the importance of separation of church

34 Id. In this regard, it is important to note that the Swiss laws at issue were
not explicitly banning religious wear, but rather included a general rule, under
section 6 to the Swiss Public Education Act, according to which "the public education system shall ensure that the political and religious beliefs of pupils and parents are respected." Id. at 454.
35 See generally Dahlab (the circumstances of the case).
36 Dahlab, supranote 8, at 454.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 453. The Swiss Federal Court further stated that "[c]ivil servants are
bound by a special relationship of subordination to the public authorities, a relationship which they have freely accepted and from which they benefit; it is therefore justifiable that they should enjoy public freedoms to a limited extent only. In
particular, the legal basis for restrictions on such freedoms does not have to be especially precise." Id.
39 Carolyn Evans criticizes this assessment that was affirmed by the ECtHR
and states the problems to accept such general assertions in the field of human
rights law. Evans, supra note 4, at 60. The most disturbing issue is that the "average man" assumption is based on convictions of majority groups. Id.
40
Dahlab,supra note 8, at 452-53.
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and state and the distinct secular nature of the education system. 41
Only at the margins of its ruling, the Swiss Federal Court noted
that "it must also be acknowledged that it is difficult to reconcile
the wearing of a headscarf with the principle of gender equality ...
"42

The above reasoning of the Swiss Federal Court was fully accepted and justified by the ECtHR. With regards to the absence of
an explicit prohibition "prescribed by law" (required by the European Convention in order to set limits on a person's right to manifest religion), the Court noted that "the wording of many statutes is
not absolutely precise."4 3 It further held that the Swiss prohibition
on wearing hijab pursued aims that were legitimate under Article
9(2) of the Convention seeking to protect the rights and freedoms
of others, public safety, and public order."
In addition, to answer whether the measure taken is "necessary
in a democratic society," the Court applied the doctrine of the
Margin of Appreciation, noting that States enjoy a certain margin
of appreciation in assessing the existence and extent of the need for
interference by the Court.45 It stated that this margin is subject to
the Court's supervision.46 In exercising this supervisory jurisdiction, the Court determines "whether the measures taken at the national level were justified in principle-that is, whether the reasons
adduced to justify them appear "relevant and sufficient" and are
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued". 47 The proportionality of the measure is decided when the Court weighs the need to
protect the rights and liberties of others against the conduct of
which the applicant stood accused.48
Applying these tests in the instant case, the ECtHR expressed
its concern about the potential interference of the Islamic headscarf
with the religious beliefs of Ms. Dahlab's pupils, as well as other

41
See Dahlab, supra note 8, at 456 (noting the absence of religion from within
the public school system).
42

Id.

Id. at 461.
Id. at 462 (finding a prohibition on the wearing of a hijab acceptable under
Swiss law).
4
Id.
46
Id.
43
44

47

Id.

Id. (implementing the use of a balancing test, involving conduct and liberty interests).
48
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pupils at the school and the pupils' parents. 49 It also referred to the
breach of the principle of denominational neutrality in schools.50
The Court then upheld the Federal Court's view that the interference with the teacher's freedom to manifest her religion was justified by "the need, in a democratic society, to protect the right of
State school pupils to be taught in a context of denominational
neutrality." 51
Finally, the Court in Dahlab agreed with the Swiss Court assessment that the wearing of a headscarf by a primary-school
teacher clearly indicates adherence to a particular faith and that
such religious garments constitute a "'powerful external symbol."5 2
It also adopted the final statement made by the Swiss Court that
gender equality must also be protected, even though it was a mere
statement without any conceptual reasoning.53 In its ruling the
Court concluded, bearing in mind the young age of the children
concerned, 54 that:
... the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of
proselytizing effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed on
women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran and
which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square with
the principle of gender equality. It therefore appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with
the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all,
equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their pupils. 55
In addition, the Court dismissed the final argument made by
the teacher regarding discrimination.5 6 According to the teacher,
the prohibition violated Article 14 of the Convention and amounted to discrimination on the ground of sex, in that a Muslim man is
not subject to the prohibition, whereas a woman with similar be-

49

Id.

50 Id. at 462.
51 Id.
52 Id.

53

at 463.

Id.

54 Id. ("The applicant's pupils were aged between four and eight, a period
during which children wonder about many things and are also more easily influenced than older pupils").
55 Id.
56 Id. at 464.
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liefs had to refrain from practicing her religion.57 Ironically, and in
contrast with its aforementioned conclusion on the impact of the
headscarf on women's equality, the Court noted that the prohibition on wearing an Islamic headscarf was purely in the context of
the teacher's professional duties, and "was not directed at her as a
member of the female sex." 8
The above reasoning about the potential effect of the headscarf
has been applied in later decisions of the Court (and of other national courts) to justify state limitations on Islamic dress in educational establishments. 59
1.2.2. Leyla Sahin v. Turkey
1.2.2.1. Facts and Judgment
Guided by Dahlab, in an extensive decision, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Leyla Sahin v. Turkey ruled that Istanbul University's ban on headscarves did not violate freedom of religion of
a Muslim Medicine student. 60 The case was ultimately decided in
a rare split decision by the Grand Chamber, when Judge Tulkens
decided not to vote with the majority on the question of Article 9 of
the Convention regarding the interpretations of the freedom to religion. 61
The facts in brief mention that Leyla Sahin was a fifth year
medicine student at Istanbul University. 62 Sahin claimed to have
worn the Islamic headscarf for the four years as a student at another Turkish university, while after only few months at Istanbul University, the Vice-Chancellor of the University issued a ban on
headscarves and other religious expressions. His decision banned
male students with beards and female students who wear the Islamic headscarf, from attending lectures, tutorials and examinations.63 Accordingly, after refusing to remove her headscarf, Sahin
57

Id.
Id.
59
See generally Dogru, supra note 8; R. (Shabina Begum) v. Headteacher and
Governors of Denbigh High School, [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 2 WLR (H.L.) 719
(appeal taken from Eng.) [hereinafter Begum]. See infra Section 4.
6o Sahin, supra note 1.
61 Id. at 42 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 3.
63 According to the ECtHR, the circular reads, in part, as follows:
By virtue of the Constitution, the law and regulations, and in accordance with the case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court
5
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was denied access to medical exams and courses, and was finally
suspended (though later granted an amnesty). Ultimately, Sahin
abandoned her studies in Turkey, and enrolled in Vienna University in Austria where she completed her education.64
In her arguments, Sahin requested the Court to recognize the
principles of pluralism and broadmindedness existing in democratic societies, and further submitted that the States should not be
given a wide margin of appreciation allowing them to regulate
students' dress. 65 She further advocated for her right to free choice
and asked the Court to distinguish her case from previous similar
rulings. Sahin claimed that university students "were discerning
adults who enjoyed full legal capacity and were capable of deciding for themselves what was appropriate conduct." 6 6 Sahin mentioned that her choice to wear headscarf based on her religious
conviction is one of the most fundamental rights in a pluralistic
liberal democracy.67 Furthermore, she argued that merely wearing
the Islamic headscarf cannot be considered as against the principle
of equality between men and women, "as all religions imposed
such restrictions on dress which people were free to choose whether
or not to comply with." 68 (emphasis added).
On the other side, it is clear throughout the decision that the
Turkish authorities have had a genuine concern over women's
rights and the value of State secularism. The Turkish government
referred to the headscarf as "a sign that was regularly appropriated
by religious fundamentalist movements for political ends and constituted a threat to the rights of women." 69 As mentioned in the
and the European Commission of Human Rights and the resolutions adopted by the university administrative boards, students
whose 'heads are covered' (who wear the Islamic headscarf) and
students (including overseas students) with beards must not be
admitted to lectures, courses or tutorials. Consequently, the name
and number of any student with a beard or wearing the Islamic
headscarf must not be added to the lists of registered students.
Id. at 3 (citing Vice-Chancellor of Istanbul University, Circular Regulating Students' Admission to the University Campus (Feb. 23, 1998)).
6
Id. at 3-5.
65
See id. 100, at 23 (arguing for a restriction in prohibition on student clothing in schools).
66
Id. 1 101, at 24.
67
Id. at 24.
6 Id.
69 Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. 220, Fourth Section
(2004) [hereinafter Sahin (Fourth Section)]; see also Bennoune, supra note 3, for an
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ECtHR's ruling, the Supreme Administrative Court in Turkey had
consistently held that wearing the Islamic headscarf at university
was not compatible with the fundamental principles of the secular
Republic, since the headscarf was in the process of becoming the
symbol of a political religious vision that was contrary to the freedoms of women and those fundamental principles. 70 In addition,
in its pleading before the previous instance of the European Court
of Human Rights, 71 the Turkish government claimed that "secularism was a preliminary requisite for a liberal, pluralist democracy," 72 and argued that the protection of the secular state through
the headscarf bans was a necessary element for the realization of
human rights in the Turkish context. 7
The ECtHR's assessment supported this vision and the arguments made by the Turkish authorities. The Court dedicated the
first part of its ruling to an historical overview of Turkey's special
secular character where it describes at length the Turkish history,
state regulations on religious dress, and the value of secularism. 74
The Court noted the revolutionary reforms establishing the Turkish nation, from the abolition of the religious caliphate (1923), to
the repeal of the constitutional provision declaring Islam the religion of the State (1928), and lastly the constitutional status to the
principle of secularism (1924).75 The Court also mentions that the
"defining feature of the Republican ideal was the presence of
women in public life and their active participation in society ...
[and] the idea that women should be freed from religious constraints. . . ."76 The national bans on religious attire (including

headscarves) were perceived only as a natural part of these devel-

extensive review of the Turkish social context.
70
See Sahin, supra note 1, 1 93, at 22. In addition, the ECtHR cites a judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of Turkey of 13 December 1984, in
which the Court held that regulations banning headscarves in institutions of higher education were lawful, noting that "[b]eyond being a mere innocent practice,
wearing the headscarf is in the process of becoming the symbol of a vision that is
contrary to the freedoms of women and the fundamental principles of the Republic." Id. 1 37, at 9.
71 Sahin (Fourth Section), supra note 69.
72 Id. $ 91, at 20.
73 Id. (linking the protection of human rights with secularity).
74 Sahin, supra note 1, at 7-13 (recounting the historically secular nature of
Turkey and its emphasis on a separation between church and state).
75 Id. 30, at 7.
76

Id.
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opments.77
Furthermore, the Court noted that wearing an Islamic headscarf (in particular) in school and university is a recent development in the Turkish society, known since the 1980s.78 The Court
linked this development to a more recent one at the political arena.
It indicates that the new leading political party, as well as the former prime minister, expressed ambivalence towards democratic
values and advocated the creation of new legal systems that will
operate by religious rules.79 Subsequently, the Court stressed that
these developments are perceived in the Turkish society as "a genuine threat to republican values and civil peace."80 The Court emphasized this political meaning of the Islamic headscarf specifically
in Turkey,81 as opposed to the issue regularly debated in most European countries in this context, which mainly revolved around the
individual liberty to manifest religion or to be "free" from religion. 82
In its ruling, the Court determined that the restrictions on the
right to wear the Islamic headscarf in universities constituted an
interference with the student's right to manifest her religion.83
When considering the circumstances of the case and the decisions
made by the domestic courts, the Court found that the interference
with Sahin's rights pursued "the legitimate aims of protecting the
7 As elaborated by the ECtHR of the ruling: "The first legislation to regulate
dress was the Headgear Act of 28 November 1925 (Law no. 671), which treated
dress as a modernity issue. Similarly, a ban was imposed on wearing religious
attire other than in places of worship or at religious ceremonies, irrespective of the
religion or belief concerned, by the Dress (Regulations) Act of 3 December 1934
(Law no. 2596)." Id. 33, at 9.
78 Id. 1 35, at 8.
79 Id.
80 Id.

81 See id. 1 115, at 28 ("Imposing limitations on freedom in this sphere may,
therefore, be regarded as meeting a pressing social need by seeking to achieve
those two legitimate aims, especially since, as the Turkish courts stated[,] . . . this
religious symbol has taken on political significance in Turkey in recent years.").
The ECtHR also mentions in this regard the State of Azerbaijan and Albania, as
opposed to most European countries in which the debate has focused mainly on
primary and secondary schools and the question of individual liberty. Id. $ 55, at
13.
82 Id. 1 55, at 13.
83
See id. 78, at 19 (citing Chamber's opinion in saying "the Court proceeds
on the assumption that the regulations in issue, which placed restrictions of place
and manner on the right to wear the Islamic headscarf in universities, constituted
an interference with the applicant's right to manifest her religion.").
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rights and freedoms of others and of protecting public order."8 4
The Court then assessed whether these limitations are "necessary in a democratic society."85 In its assessment the Court reiterated that, as enshrined in Article 9, freedom of religion does not
protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief. 86 It
recognized that in democratic societies, in which several religions
coexist, it may be necessary to place restrictions on certain practices
of religion in order to reconcile the interests of the various
groups. 87 However, at the same time, the Court noted that it is the
States' duty to ensure mutual tolerance between opposing groups,
not by removing the cause of tension or eliminating pluralism, but
by ensuring that the competing groups tolerate each other. 88
Ironically, though accepting the Turkish ban, the Court described in length the supposedly neutral and impartial role a state
should have in relation to religious disputes, noting the importance
of a State's duty not to interfere with the legitimacy of a certain religious belief or expression.89
It is also then that the Court cited a long list of precedents to
explain the wide margin of appreciation allowing States broad discretion especially in questions concerning the relationship between
State and religion, on which "opinion in a democratic society may
reasonably differ widely."90 According to the Court, given the European diversity of approaches on these issues, it becomes impossible to discern or to impose a uniform conception of religion in so-

84 Id.
99, at 23 ("[T]he Court is able to accept that the impugned interference primarily pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms
of others and of protecting public order, a point which is not in issue between the
parties.").
85 Id.

Id. 105, at 25.
87 Id. T 106, at 25.
86

88 See id. 107, at 25 ("The Court has frequently emphasised the State's role
as the neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths
and beliefs, and stated that this role is conducive to public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society. It also considers that the State's duty of
neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power on the State's part to
assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed . . . and that it requires the State to ensure mutual tolerance between op-

posing groups."). The Court then continues to an extensive rationalization of the
importance of principles of pluralism, dialogue and the spirit of compromise necessary in a democracy. Id. 107, at 25-26.
89 See id. (describing the Turkish ban).
90 Id.

109, at 26.
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ciety. 91 Accordingly, the Court ruled that the choice of the extent
and form such regulations on religious practice should take, will
depend on the specific domestic context. 92
Without providing any explanation on how the principle of
gender equality is preserved by the ban on Islamic headscarf or
otherwise at risk without such ban, the Court upheld the Chamber's (the lower instance at the ECtHR) observation in this regard.
The Court adopted the Chamber's conclusion referring to the additional value recognized by the Turkish constitutional system to the
protection of the rights of women, and its well-established principle of gender equality (which is also one of the key principles underlining the European Convention, and a goal of the member
states).93 In addition, it endorsed the Chamber's concern of the
possible threat "such symbol" as the Islamic headscarf may have in
the Turkish context on those who choose not to wear it. According
to the Chamber, it may be of a compulsory nature, imposing religious duties on others. 94 Thus, for the Court, combating gender
discrimination was an acceptable reason for the Turkish ban.
Finally, noting the decision in Dahlab, Turkey's historical background, and the above reasoning, the Court upheld the ban and
concluded that it considers the notion of secularism in Turkey (not
only as guaranteeing the values of liberty and equality, but also as
a wall against extremist movements) to be consistent with the values of the European Convention.95
1.2.2.2. Judge Tulkens' DissentingOpinion in Sahin
As stated above, Judge Tulkens of the ECtHR Grand Chamber
issued a long and thorough dissenting opinion, which expressed
91 Id. (discussing the tension between one's freedom to exercise religion and
another's freedom from any particular religion, as may exist in a diverse democratic state).
92 Id.
93 Sahin, supra note 1, 115 ("After examining the parties' submissions, the
Grand Chamber sees no good reason to depart from the approach taken by the
Chamber. . .").
94 Sahin (Fourth Section), supra note 69, at 107-09. See Sahin, supra note 1,
115, at 28 (citing amply from Chamber's analysis). See also Bennoune, supra note 3,
at 381 (concluding that because Turkey is ninety-nine percent Muslim, which removes the concern of certain types of discrimination, these measures taken to
combat fundamentalist coercion of students were seen as justified in the context of
the Turkish society).
9s Sahin, supra note 1, 114 at 28 (laying out the Court's finding that secularism is in accordance with the spirit of the Convention).
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some of the most common human rights-based critiques of the Sahin case, raised by both opponents and proponents of the headscarf ban.96 Tulkens criticized almost every aspect of the majority's
application of the tests set forth in the Court's case law, as well as
its concluding observations. More specifically, she disagreed with
the manner in which the Court applied the margin of appreciation
doctrine, expressing her great concern for the wide latitude allowed on these issues, leading to what seemed as simply eliminating any judicial supervision on states' action ("European supervision seems quite simply to be absent from the judgment").97
Furthermore, Tulkens strongly disagreed with the manner in
which the majority applied the principles of secularism and equality, and interpreted them in relation to the practice of wearing the
headscarf. In this regard, she accused the Court of relying exclusively on reasons cited by the national authorities and courts, and
characterizing these as principles brought "in general and abstract
terms," without stating on what grounds the interference was justified ("where there has been interference with a fundamental right,
the Court's case-law clearly establishes that mere affirmations do
not suffice").98 Furthermore, Judge Tulkens pointed out that only
recently, in the sphere of the right to freedom of expression, was
the Court willing to protect a Muslim religious leader who had
been convicted for violently criticizing the secular regime in Turkey.99 Thus, while the right to manifest one's religion by peacefully wearing headscarf is prohibited under the Convention, incitements to religious hatred are fully covered by the freedom of
expression.
96 Id. at 42-52 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). See also Bennoune, supra note 3, at 42324 (discussing Judge Tulkens' dissent in detail).
97 See Sahin, supra note 1, at 44 (Tulkens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's
deviation from a review conducted in concreto, by reference to three criteria: the
appropriateness, restrictiveness, and proportionality of the measures taken).
98 See id. at 44-45 (pointing out also that the Court has been much more willing to protect merely religious sentiments, thus its approach to religious practice
seems surprising).
99 The Muslim leader was convicted for calling for the introduction of the
Sharia, and referring to children born of civil marriages rather than religious marriages as bastards. See generally Gunduz v. Turkey, No. 35071/97, 2003-XI Eur. Ct.
H.R. (concluding that hateful and controversial remarks made by a Muslim religious leader nevertheless did not fall outside protected speech); see also Sahin, supra note 1, at 47-49 (Tulkens, J., dissenting) (noting the inconsistency in jurisprudence that would be created by the Court's opinion, and opining that the court's
conclusion runs counter to existing case law while also being needlessly paternalistic).
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Judge Tulkens made other references to instances in case law
that would be inconsistent with the majority opinion, making the
Court's reasoning to seem even more questionable. More of her
observations are discussed in the next two parts of this paper.
1.3. Dogru v. France
Dogru v. France00 is the most recent case brought before the ECtHR (2009) regarding the Islamic headscarf. The case's importance
lies in the insight it provides into the application of past case law.
It demonstrates how some of the critiques made in reference to the
future of the case law regarding these issues have turned into a reality, especially with regard to the generality of the decisions and
the absence of women's human rights analysis.
The principle of gender equality has received an even smaller
place in this case, as it was simply absent from the Court's assessment, and was mentioned only as part of the description of the
facts and ruling in the former case of Dahlab.10 Furthermore, the
doctrine of the margin of appreciation was even further extended,
such that concurrently state authorities have almost full discretion
when regulating religious freedoms.102
Dogru, an eleven-year-old French Muslim girl, had refused to
take her headscarf off during physical education classes. 03 The
100 See generally Dogru, supra note 8 (discussing the judgment of the court in
evaluating whether the rights of a French teenager had been violated after she
was expelled from school for failing to take off her headscarf during school activities).
101

Dogru, supra note 8, at 17-18.

In the case of Dahlab, . . . [t]he Court stressed the 'powerful external symbol' represented by wearing the headscarf and also considered the proselytising effect that it might have seeing that it appeared to be imposed on
women by a religious precept which was hard to square with the principle of gender equality. Id. (citation omitted).
102 Dogru, supra note 8, at 19-20.
Having regard to the margin of appreciation which must be left to the
member States with regard to the establishment of the delicate relations
between the Churches and the State, religious freedom thus recognised
and restricted by the requirements of secularism appears legitimate in
the light of the values underpinning the Convention.... [H]aving regard to the circumstances of the case, and taking account of the margin
of appreciation that should be left to the States in this domain, the Court
concludes that the interference in question was justified as a matter of
principle and proportionate to the aim pursued.
103
Dogru, supranote 8, at 1-2.
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school's Pupil Discipline Committee decided to expel her from
school, and Dogru's parents appealed the decision. 04 The appeal
panel decided to uphold the Discipline Committee decision on
several grounds, including the girl's failure to comply with the
school's internal rules. The ruling was also based on a decision
made by the Conseil d'Etat. 105
It should be noted that at one stage of the proceedings, Dogru
offered to wear a hat or balaclava instead of her headscarf. However, the school authorities dismissed her proposal, and the Government mentioned in its submissions to the Court that her proposal "did not in itself constitute proof of her willingness to find a
compromise." 0 6
For several years, the parents continued to appeal the decisions
to domestic courts and their arguments were dismissed. Ultimately, the highest instance hearing of the case (the Nantes Administrative Court of Appeals) found that Dogru's behavior "overstepped
the limits of the right to express and manifest her religious beliefs
on the school premises." 07 An attempt to appeal this decision was
rejected.108
The new panel of the ECtHR sitting as a Chamber (Fifth Section) (a lower instance) fully applied the previous case law though
now the subject at issue was a young girl. The panel expressed its
concern about the potential effect of the headscarf, and found that
the values promoted by France justify the limitation on Dogru's
dress, based on the margin of appreciation doctrine.109
More specifically, the Court emphasized the importance of the
concept of secularism in France, established in its constitution and
other founding national documents. Some of these documents
specifically address limitations on the manifestation of religion in
view of the public order. Additionally, according to the Court, the
notion of the separation between church and state is deeply rooted
Id.
The decision by the Conseil d'Etat found that "wearing a headscarf as a
sign of religious affiliation was incompatible with the proper conduct of physical
education and sports classes." Id. at 2.
106
Id. at 11.
107 Id. at 3.
108 See id. at 2-3 (noting that the local higher authorities rejected the plaintiff's appeal on the grounds that wearing a headscarf would not allow the girl to
participate in physical education).
109
Dogru, supra note 8,
61-76 (emphasizing in length the wide margin of
appreciation in these cases).
104
105
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in the French history and among the majority population." 0 As the
Court describes it, "in return for the protection of his or her freedom of religion, the citizen must respect the public arena that is
shared by all.""' The Court further noted that "only from the
1980s onwards ... was the French model of secularism challenged,
particularly in the public school context."112
Furthermore, since the Court adopted the government's assertions to uphold the ban, it is worth mentioning few of them.
In 2003, a decade after the first headscarf cases were introduced
in 1989, and as a response to the new wave of immigration and its
alleged resentment towards the Republic's principles, the President
of France appointed the "Satsi commission" to study the issue.113
The Satsi commission's findings, cited by the ECtHR, vividly
demonstrate the immense tension between the Islamic minority
and the majority population in France. The Satsi commission argued that "instances of behavior and conduct that run counter to
the principle of secularism" are increasing." 4 Referring to the minority groups in the French society as "others," the Satsi commission enumerated several reasons for the deteriorating situation of
the French secularism values, to include: the integrating difficulties experienced by "those who have arrived in France during the
past decades," the living conditions in "our towns," unemployment, discrimination and the Islamic people feeling that they are
being "driven out of the national community."" 5 The Commission
noted that it is for these reasons that "these people" claim to be
driven to fight the values of the Republic." 6 Thus, the Commission
concluded:
It is with these threats in mind and in the light of the values
of our Republic that we have formulated the proposals set
out in this report.

. .

. [Regarding the headscarf, the report

110 See id. at 3-4 (discussing the French civic history in which great value was
placed on secularism, dating back to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
the Citizen of 1789).
uM Id. at 3-4.
112 Id.

Id. at 4-5 (tracing the raison d'etre for the Satsi Commission and summarizing some of its results).
114 See id. (discussing the various findings of the Stasi commission and taking
a negative view of the wearing of headscarves due to its religious connotations).
113

115 Id.
116 Id.
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states that] for the school community[,] ... the visibility of a
religious sign is perceived by many as contrary to the role
of school, which should remain a neutral forum and a place
where the development of critical faculties is encouraged.
It also infringes the principles and values that schools are
there to teach, in particular, equality between men and
women.117
It was on the basis of this report and previous legal opinions,
that the French ban was enacted.18 The Act regulated the wearing
of signs and dress manifesting a religious affiliation in State primary and secondary schools, in accordance with the principle of secularism.119
Similar to the previous cases, in the ECtHR decision of Dogru,
the Court found the prohibition on Dogru's headscarf to be an interference with the right to manifest religionl 20 that is prescribed by
law and pursued a legitimate aim (of protecting the rights and
freedoms of others and protecting public order).121
In assessing the necessity of the prohibition, the Court applied
the margin of appreciation doctrine, and reiterated the previous
holding in Sahin that in questions concerning the relationship between State and religions, member states' decisions must be seriously considered.122 According to the Court, this is especially true
when regulating the wearing of religious symbols in educational
institutions.123 The Court further addressed at length the importance of the principles of secularism and neutrality, and the
specific justification in the instant case to protect the health and
Id. at 5 (alteration in original).
Id. ("It is on the basis of these proposals that the Act of 15 March 2004 was
enacted").
119 Id. at 9 ("Parliament enacted ... the Law "on secularism," regulating, in
accordance with the principle of secularism, the wearing of signs or dress manifesting a religious affiliation in State primary and secondary schools.").
120 Id. at 16 ("[T]he Court concludes that the interference in question had a
sufficient legal basis in domestic law. . . . [T]he Court can accept that the interference complained of mainly pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the rights
and freedoms of others and protecting public order.").
121 Id. at 13 ("The Court reiterates that, according to its case-law, wearing the
headscarf may be regarded as "motivated or inspired by a religion or religious
belief. . .") (citation omitted).
122
See id. at 17 (stating that the role of the national decision-making body
must be given special importance in addressing questions concerning the relationship between the State and religions).
117

118

123

Id.
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safety of the pupils.124

Regrettably, in this case the Court did not even stress the importance of the principle of gender equality in its assessment, but
merely mentioned it in one line together with the facts and observations made by the Court in Dahlab.125
1.4. Critiques on the ECtHR Decisions

As expected, the restrictions on the Islamic veil in Europe and
the judicial rulings affirming them (by the ECtHR or by other European Courts) have sparked sharp criticism from feminist scholars, human rights groups and other international human rights inThe critique focused mostly on the narrow,
stitutions.126
superficial and racial viewpoints expressed by proponents of the
bans, and on the oppression of women's religious liberties. It was
claimed that women should be free to practice their religion as they
so chose.127 Some even offered feminist interpretations of the
headscarves and indicated the positive effects of veiling on women's equality.128 It seems that this strong opposition stems primarily from the absence of genuine and serious consideration of the
contending opinions, whether from those supporting the bans or
those against them.
Judge Tulkens, in her minority opinion in Sahin, rigorously ob124 See id. at 19 (outlining certain circumstances in which upholding secularism is of particular importance, such as where secularism is a constitutional principle, while also noting that court was convinced by the assertion of health and
safety issues as at least partial justification for a legitimate ban).
125
See id. at 18 (mentioning Dahlab in passing while listing a series of other
cases of relevance, such as Sahin).
126
See Stopler, supra note 4, at 211-12 (arguing that wearing the veil in the
public sphere of European countries is perceived as incompatible with the republican understanding of religious neutrality, which leads to unjustified restriction
of religious freedom and discrimination of minority residents of the state); Jonathan Sugden, A Certain Lack of Empathy, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 1, 2004),
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/07/01/turkey8985.htm (claiming that
"the ECtHR judgment draws the conclusion that this abstract principle of secularism must take priority over the rights, future and welfare of an individual"). See
generally Chinkin, supra note 4 (making similar points); Evans, supra note 4 (criticizing restrictions).
127

Id.

See Chinkin, supra note 4, at 72-73 (criticizing the decision of the Court,
while noting that voluntary wear of headscarves could be considered emancipating, while discussing stereotypes about the effects of permitting women to wear
the items in question). See generally Stopler, supra note 4 (offering interpretation
and explaining the positive effects of the Islamic veil).
128
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jects to the Court's assessment of the principle of sex equality. She
criticizes the Court's inability to explain more precisely, or even
just mention, the connection between the ban and equality.129 In
her view, nothing in the judgment could override the argument of
the student that she wore the headscarf "of her own free will," and
in an aspiration to follow her religious practice.130
Judge Tulkens further argues that "[e]quality and nondiscrimination are subjective rights which must remain under the control
of those who are entitled to benefit from them."131 She goes as far
as to blame the Court for "' [platernalism' . . . [that] runs counter to

the case-law of the Court"132 regarding the right to personal autonomy, protected under Article 8 of the Convention. 33 She concludes that the ban violates Sahin's right to freedom of religion and
cannot be considered as "necessary in a democratic society."1 34
The UN Human Rights Committee has also expressed its view
on this debate, regarding a case in which a student claimed to be
harassed by university authorities for wearing the headscarf. 135 In
that case, the Committee commented on the application of Article
18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (on
religious freedom),136 stating that the freedom to manifest one's religion encompasses the right to wear clothes or attire in public
which is in conformity with the individual's faith or religion. Fur129
See Sahin, supra note 1, at 48 (Tulkens, J., dissenting) (discussing the issue
of gender equality which Tulkens claims the Court overlooked in its majority
opinion, noting that it did not state what the connection was between the ban and
promoting equality between men and women, while also noting that member
state courts had previously noted that such headgear could be worn for a variety
of reasons).
130 Id. 1 12.
131
See id. at 48 (taking issue with the Grand Chamber's analysis of Sahin, supra note 1, in light of Dahlab, supra note 8).
132
Id.
133 European Convention, supra note 13, at art. 8. ("Right to respect for private and family life-1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a
public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.").
134
Sahin, supra note 1, at 49.
135
See International Convention on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (governing freedom of thought and religion).
136

Id.
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thermore, it considered that preventing a person from wearing religious clothing in public or private may constitute a violation of
the Covenant. 3 7
In this regard, in 2004, the UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child, in its concluding observations regarding France's second periodic report, expressed concern over the new legislation adopted
in France on wearing religious symbols and clothing in public
schools.138 The Committee noted that such legislation might be
counterproductive, as it may eventually neglect the best interests
of the children and limit their access to education.139
In addition, some feminists argue that the collective regulations
on women's autonomy derive from stereotypes of Muslim women
as oppressed and of Muslim men as overbearing and oppressive.140
Carolyn Evans specifically criticizes the ECtHR's reliance on stereotypes and generalizations about Muslim women, and Islam more
generally.141 Christine Chinkin also points out the gross and erroneous generalization of all Muslims as belonging to one homogenous group, sharing the same norms, religious principles and beliefs, rather than as different individuals who may wish to adhere
to religion from varied perspectives.142
See Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, United Nations Human Rights
at
6.2,
U.N.
Doc.
No.
931/2000,
Committee,
Communication
CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000 (2005) (summarizing the facts of the case involving a
student claiming that her freedom of thought and religion was violated as a result
of the university's ban on headscarves).
13s
See U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observa25, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.240 (June 30, 2004) (expressing
tions: France,
concern about recent legislative developments in France that restricting wearing
of religious headgear as potentially counterproductive).
139 Id.
140 See generally Evans, supra note 4, at 54, 71-73 (providing critical analysis
on the Court's general presumptions over Islam and Muslim women as victims of
a gender oppressive religion, needing protection from abusive male norms, as
well as fundamentalists who force Islam values onto the unwilling and engaged
in dangerous proselytizing). See also Chinkin, supra note 4, at 71-72 (describing
various stereotypes of Muslim women, and their potential use as arguments by
state officials to justify bans).
141 See generally Evans, supra note 4, 56, 71-73 (exploring the way stereotypes
and false images on Muslim women inform the Court's decisions stemming mainly from the Court's narrow view of the debate in terms of European Christianity
or secularism).
142
See Chinkin, supra note 4, at 71-72 (explaining the gross generalization in
detail, noting that such generalizations fail to account for the idea that not all
Muslims agree on issues, or that they belong to a single homogenous group or
manifest religious beliefs in identical fashion).
137
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In this regard, it is also argued that the bans are a part of European states' efforts to protect the public order from the perceived
threat of radical political Islam and from the danger of Islamization
of Europe, as a consequence of Muslim immigration into Europe,
rather than a protection on women's rights. 143
Furthermore, as stated by Judge Tulkens and other feminists,
the Islamic veil has many meanings.144 Judge Tulkens cites the
German Constitutional Court which recognized that veiling is a
practice engaged in for a variety of reasons, and as opposed to the
Court's generalization, it "does not necessarily symbolise the submission of women to men and ... in certain cases, it can even be a
means of emancipating women." 145 Similarly, others note that
Muslim women freely choose to wear religious garments, not as a
symbol of oppression, but rather "as a tool of identity, freedom,
empowerment and emancipation." 146
It is also claimed that the general resistance to and lack of ability to reconcile the Islamic headscarf with "the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and nondiscrimination," 147 commonly belongs to people outside of the religion who are unable to understand the religious aspirations, and as
a result themselves demonstrate intolerance, disrespect and inequality.148 Carolyn Evans views the ECtHR judgments as demonstrating its "general reluctance to acknowledge the value and reli143 See Stopler, supra note 4, at 207 (delving into other factors, such as fear of
radicalism, that drives the ban on head scarves across European nations).
144 See Sahin, supra note 1, at 225 (Tulkens, J., dissenting) (discussing the issue of gender equality overlooked by the Court, while noting that the veil has
been interpreted by other courts such as the German Constitutional Court to potentially be worn for a number of different reasons); see also Faegheh Shirazi, Islamic Religion and Women's Dress Code: The Islamic Republic of Iran, in UNDRESSING
RELIGION: COMMITMENT AND CONVERSION FROM A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 113,
118-19 (Linda Arthur ed., 2000) (describing the many meanings of the Islamic
veil).
145
Sahin, supra note 1, at 225.
146
Chinkin, supra note 4, at 72-73. Muslim women are denied free choice
and agency when they freely choose to wear it as a part of their identity, and there
are a multiplicity of issues involved in wearing or refusing to wear the headscarf.
Id.
147 See Dahlab, supra note 8, at 450 (characterizing the Islamic headscarf).
148
See Chinkin, supra note 4, at 73 (illustrating the point that non-religious
people potentially demonstrate intolerance, disrespect and inequality as a result
of their ideals about tolerance, respect and equality, by characterizing what may
be at stake aside from religious freedom when wearers of hijabs protest against
bans).
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gious importance of many key religious practices outside Christianity." 149 She notes that the Court chose to rely on the popular
western viewpoint that Islam is oppressive, without even discussing the different interpretations given to religious clothing by different Muslim societies and different Muslim scholais.150
Finally, another important argument of several scholars is that
the bans will eventually lead to the exclusion of religious women
from the public sphere and deny them of access to public places
(e.g., schools, universities and other educational institutions, certain government positions, etc.). 151 One such scholar, Evans, views
the bans as "a peculiar way to achieve gender equality," and
stresses that this consideration has a potential to harm religious
women's rights to work and to acquire education in the name of
equality.152
2.

WOMEN'S VOICES - THE MISSING ELEMENT IN THE ECTHR
RULINGS

The debate over the Islamic headscarf is in its essence a story
about women. It is a controversy about a social narrative that goes
to make up the identity of women and their conception of life, on
either side of the issue. The diverse voices of women seeking to
protest, challenge and shape the positions in this discussion certainly exist. Women have articulated their opinions, views, aspirations and beliefs in numerous articles, exploring every possible aspect and theory related to the debate in extensive interdisciplinary
research.153
Nevertheless, these voices were simply not given the weight
they deserve at what may be the most important court in the world

Evans, supranote 4, at 56.
150 Id. at 65.
151 See Chinkin, supra note 4, at 70 (discussing clashes between governments
and how women expressing and manifesting their religious beliefs can and has
led to conflict regarding what proper dress code for Muslim women are in various
public institutions); Evans, supra note 4, at 68, 73. Ms. Sahin also claimed that her
right to education was violated by the ban, as she was refused access to the university. Sahin, supra note 1, 1125, at 208.
152 Evans, supranote 4, at 68-69.
153 See generally Chinkin, supra note 4; Bouthaina Shaaban, The Muted Voices of
Women Interpreters, in FAITH AND FREEDOM: WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
MUSLIM WORLD 61, at 68-72 (Mahnaz Afkhami ed., 1995) (discussing in detail other literature discussing the history and rationalizations behind wearing the hijab
from the perspective of women); Evans, supra note 4.
149
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in the field of international human rights law - the European Court
of Human Rights.' 54 The difficulty in the absence of women opinions had been an issue of concern for women from both sides of the
story on the veil. 55
Before continuing to my argument on the importance of the
elaboration of ECtHR jurisprudence on women's rights and religion, and the reasons for its absence, I dedicate this section to discussing and exploring a few of the feminist perspectives and viewpoints in this multifaceted debate. This section also includes a
more general discussion on women's rights, gender equality and
religious freedoms.
To better frame the discussion, following Susan Okin's definition, I would like to clarify that by feminism, I mean to address "the
belief that women should not be disadvantaged by their sex, that
they should be recognized as having human dignity equal to that
of men, and that they should have the opportunity to live as fulfilling and as freely chosen lives as men."156
2.1. The Conflict Between Gender Equality and Freedom of Religion
The ECtHR's general assumption, repeated over the three cases, is that the wearing of the headscarf represents "a powerful ex-

154 In Sahin, the most extensive reasoning, the majority's Judgment, is spread
over 40 pages and 166 paragraphs, of which approximately ten paragraphs mention the issue of gender equality and only three short paragraphs are the actual
Court assessment. The three relevant paragraphs that constitute the Court's assessment of gender equality are paragraphs 113, 115, and 116. See generally Sahin,
supra note 1. In Dogru, the Court simply cites the short general statement in
Dahlab. Dogru, supra note 8, 64, at 18; Dahlab, supra note 8.
155 Sahin, supra note 1,
11, at 225 (Tulkens, J., dissenting) ("What is lacking
in this debate is the opinion of women, both those who wear the headscarf and
those who choose not to."); Bennoune, supra note 3, at 423 ("Notwithstanding the
overall conclusion on Sahin here, it is regrettable that few women are even given
voice in the debate.... This is not to disqualify male voices, but to hope rather
that women of diverse views are more empowered in the discussion."); Evans,
supra note 4, at 66, 60 ("The Court does not develop its reasoning in either case,
merely stating that it is 'difficult to reconcile' the wearing of the headscarf and
gender equality. It is not clear where this difficulty lies. There are certainly feminist arguments from both Muslims and non-Muslims that criticise the wearing of

the headscarf as oppressive to women .

. .

. The determination of rights issues,

based on assertions about the convictions of majorities about what is important
and what is not, has serious implications for religious freedom which are insufficiently explored in the judgments [of the ECtHR]").
156
Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in Is
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
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ternal symbol" 57 (thus, jeopardizing the beliefs of school pupils,
their parents and university students), which also appeared "to be
imposed on women by a religious precept that was hard to reconcile with the principle of gender equality."158 It further ruled that it
could not easily be reconciled "with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination
that all teachers in a democratic society should convey to their pu1 59
pils."
At first sight, it seems that this holding is fully consistent with
feminist theories of gender equality. However, it missed the far
complex reality and the heavy considerations brought by feminists
to this debate. As articulated by Judge Tulkens in her dissenting
opinion:
Turning to equality, the majority focus on the protection of
women's rights and the principle of sexual equality... .
However, what, in fact, is the connection between the ban
and sexual equality? The judgment does not say....
[W]earing the headscarf has no single meaning; it is a practice that is engaged in for a variety of reasons. It does not
necessarily symbolise the submission of women to men and
there are those who maintain that, in certain cases, it can
even be a means of emancipating women.160
Following Judge Tulkens' logic, many gender-specific human
rights violations are grounded in religious practices, leading to the
claim that democratic societies need to challenge religious conducts as means of ending gender inequality.161 As women are traditionally deteriorated under some religious influences, some feminist scholars posit an inherent conflict between women's rights
and religion directly affecting gender equality,162 thus advocating
Dahlab, supra note 8, at 463.
Sahin, supra note 1,
111, at 205 (repeating the ruling in Dahlab). In
Dahlab, the Court referred specifically to the Islamic Koran stating that the wearing of the Islamic headscarf "appears to be imposed on women by a precept
which is laid down in the Koran and which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to
square with the principle of gender equality." Dahlab,supra note 8, at 463.
159 Sahin, supra note 1, 111, at 205.
11, at 225 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
160 Sahin, supra note 1,
161 Sullivan, supra note 7, at 795.
162
See, e.g., Cema & Wallace, supranote 10; Okin, supra note 156, at 17, 22-24
(Okin argues that multiculturalism and recognition of cultural rights poses serious threats to women's rights); Stopler, supra note 7; Sullivan, supra note 7, at 795804 (addressing gender as basis for differentiation).
157
158
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for secular democratic values to be applied in such cases. 163 However, believers themselves, including women, have contended that
these practices are deeply rooted in their religious liberty and freedom of belief, and as such are entitled to full protection under international and national laws.164
More specifically, on one side of the debate over the Islamic
headscarf the argument is made for: women's rights to manifest
their religion; women's individual autonomy and their right to free
choice; the threat of denying religious women access to public
places by setting limitations on their ability to observe their religious duties in the public sphere (such as access to public positions, public education and high education institutions); and, finally, their rights to work, to education, and, in general, their right to
full citizenship and equality within society. 165
The other side puts forward claims for: women's rights and the
protection of gender equality values (around the concept of emancipation of women from patriarchal oppressive traditions based in
religion); protection of constitutional and social principles of secularism and religious neutrality; children's rights and the value of
"best interests" of a child (both with regard to children affected by
the headscarf as "observers" and Islamic girls required to wear the
headscarf from a very early age); and, where applicable, avoiding
political and religious fundamentalism.
In addition, another aspect of the debate is the extent to which
some feminists agree to acknowledge religious liberty to wear the
headscarf. Some differentiate between certain types of Islamic
veils, such as between the burqa (the full-length garment that covers the entire body, including head and face)166 and the hijab (that
covers the hair, neck and sometimes the shoulders), and are willing
to recognize the right to wear hijab but not burqa.167 Others distin163
See generally Bennoune, supra note 3 (asserting that secularism is vital for
the implementation of women's human rights and that the ECtHR ruled correctly
in Sahin when it upheld the ban on headscarves in the Turkish context).
164
See Bonnie Honig, My Culture Made Me Do It, in SUSAN M. OKIN, Is
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 36 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999) (criticizing the limited view Okin holds on religion and culture - "And, contra Okin, culture is something rather more complicated than patriarchal permission for powerful men to subordinate vulnerable women"); Sullivan, supra note 7, at 795, 821-23
(attempting to resolve these competing claims of gender equality and religious
freedom through a balancing process and application of a contextual approach).
165 See generally Chinkin, supra note 4, at 71.
166 Also referred to as the "niqab".
167 Stopler, supra note 4, at 212-13 (claiming that "the full face burqa appears
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guish between women of different ages, claiming that the standards should vary between girls wearing headscarves as opposed to
young adults (such as students) and adult women.168
The conflicting claims set significant competing considerations
that are difficult to balance and assess. In the absence of an international consensus over religion and State issues, attempts to resolve the conflict present serious philosophical, legal and political
difficulties.169 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the resolution
of difficult contesting values is only a natural aspect of the legal
scholarship and practice, and other contexts give rise to serious
conflicting considerations as well.170
Balancing this range of rights, interests and considerations,
some European countries offered accommodation to the Islamic
headscarf and other religious garments (including in educational
institutions), while others banned it.171
2.2. On Sex, Equality and Religion - The Feminist-Multicultural
Dilemma
The contested situation where women seek to manifest their
own religious beliefs according to a prohibited or otherwise unacceptable practice in a democratic society, usually arises in the context of multi-cultural societies with significant migrant communities or other minority populations.172 Indeed, the restrictions on
to have a single meaning, namely, a manifestation of the teachings of a highly patriarchal fundamentalist religious belief system in which women are fully subordinated to the authority of their husbands and other male relatives and must conceal themselves").
168 See generally Bennoune, supra note 3, at 406-07 (commenting on rights of
girls to wear headscarves under international law standards). Furthermore, Judge
Tulkens of the ECtHR argued that the ban on wearing religious symbols in educational institutions should not extend for young adults as students, "who are less
amenable to pressure." Sahin, supra note 1, T 3, at 221 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). It
should be noted that the Court, in Dahlab, also referred to the professional position held by women wearing the scarf, suggesting that as a public servant, a
teacher in the secular public education system is required to have certain values
and obligations. Dahlab, supranote 8, at 463-64.
169 Id.
170 To mention only few: national security issues, abortions, citizenship, etc.
171 The ECtHR dedicates a section on comparative law in its decision showing the differences in the place of the Islamic headscarf debate across Europe. Sahin, supra note 1, J$ 55-65, at 13-14.
172 Chinkin, supra note 4, at 70. Chinkin specifically addresses in this regard
the public debate over religious dress. Interestingly, Chinkin also addresses issues arising with men's religious dress, which stand in contrast with State regula-
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the Islamic veil have provoked litigation all over Europe, mainly
involving women belonging to minority groups (for example,
France, Switzerland and UK), and it can generally be asserted that
the wearing of the Islamic headscarf is prohibited for decades by
the dominant majority, and is a deeply socially controversial issue.173
It is for this reason that it seems inevitable to frame the following discussion through the lens of the feminist-multicultural dilemma, debating to what extent should traditional practices, considered oppressive to women, be accommodated by a democratic
state. This question can be the defining variable in the debate surrounding the Islamic veil, struggling between accommodation and
prohibition. The vast scholarship around this dilemma offers an
in-depth consideration of the principle of gender equality and its
conflict with religion, regrettably ignored by the ECtHR.
The multiculturalism argument framed by Okin, is that minority cultures (including religious ones) in liberal democracies should
receive special protection, ensuring the individual rights of their
members through "group rights" or other privileges,174 exempting
them from the majority domination and accommodating their
practices.
However, while contemporary liberal scholars' 75 portray granting minorities special cultural group rights as a way to preserve
their traditions and cultures (including religious minorities), feminists pose a strong opposition to this concept, claiming that most
cultures and religious groups are suffused with practices and traditions which stand in stark contradiction with women's rights and
gender equality.176
tions, such as in the case of Sikhs seeking to wear turbans in their position with
the police force or Jews asking to wear yarmulke in the armed forces.
173 With regard to Turkey, it is not clear whether religious women wishing to
wear the headscarf belong to the majority population. Sahin, supra note 1,
3055, at 10 (giving the historical background).
174 Okin, supra note 156, at 10-11.
175
WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS 76, 89 (1995). Kymlicka, also known as the foremost contemporary defender of cultural group rights, argues that groups should have their own
"societal cultures", which provide their members "with meaningful ways of life
across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious . .. life, encompassing both public and private spheres".
176 Okin, supra note 156, at 4, 12, 13; Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Women, Religion
and Multiculturalism in Israel, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 339, 340-41 (20002001).
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It is claimed that religious groups in particular hold norms and
values that are inherently inconsistent with several fundamental
liberal concepts of individual freedoms and are usually based on
patriarchal traditions. As articulated by Hilary Charlesworth,
there is a "fundamental inequality between women and men on
which the major religious traditions operate." 77 Consequently, in
such communities, women are denied various freedoms relating to
their personhood, dress, and access to public places.' 78
An important aspect in differentiating religion from other types
of cultures, is the fact that religious doctrines are less subject to
change as they are based on sacred texts that impose restraints on
outer influences. Yet, this resistance to change is claimed to also
derive from religious aspirations and considerations of power over
gender relations, leading to subordination of women.179
Linda Arthur notes that "in many of the most conservative
groups[,J ... dress codes are used as gender norms that reinforce
the existing power system."180 Okin expresses an even more radical position in this regard, stating "most cultures have as one of
their principal aims the control of women by men."181
Indeed, in the context of the multicultural discourse, it seems
that the religious variable in women's rights provokes the most intense arguments.182 Tensions between gender equality and freedom of religion arise especially in states where there are significant
minorities of a different religious persuasion from that of the majority population.183 In this respect, as stated above, democracies
177 Hilary Charlesworth, The Challenges of Human Rights Law for Religious Traditions, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 401, 409 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn
Evans eds., 1999).
178 See Chinkin, supra note 4, at 60 ("[B]oth religion and culture are asserted
to justify the subordination of women for a whole range of reasons .... This sub-

ordination manifests itself in. . . restrictive personal laws[,] ... [e]specially potent

through the claims made by religions to control women's bodies").
179

Id.

180 Linda Arthur, Introduction: Dress and the Social Control of the Body, in
REUGION, DREss AND THE BODY 1 (Linda Arthur ed., 1999).
181 See Okin, supra note 156, at 13, 14 (admitting that the drive to control

women has been softened in more progressive versions of Judaism, Christianity
and Islam).
182 See, e.g., Okin, supra note 156 (offering a collection of articles debating the
feminist-multicultural dilemma in response to Okin's main article on the subject);
Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 176, at 340-43 (describing at length the feministmulticultural debate).
183 See Chinkin, supra note 4, at 56 (postulating that there is resistance by the
religious minority of Western liberalism because it is seen as a new form of impe-
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face crucial questions such as to what extent should one
acknowledge freedom of religious minorities to hold their own beliefs, practices and internal norms? Should States encourage and
respect religious convictions of minorities and allow wide appreciation for their values? What happens when these values stand in
contrast with liberal principles? What premises or notions should
prevail-those

of

the

liberal

majority

or

of the

often-

discriminated minority?
As seen, the problem occurs when religion and culture are asserted to justify oppressive practices against women especially in
the context of liberal democracies aiming to accommodate these
perceptions. 84 Okin notes that in the international arena, the link
between culture and gender often leads to the rejection of women's
rights by leaders and countries.185 Thus, it is argued that claims
made in the name of religion may lead to violation of women human rights, and the subordination of women's rights to religion in
democratic states.
In addition, several arguments are made by feminists asserting
that the general principle of secularism is the only way to promote
democratic values, and that maintaining secularism is an essential
step toward dismantling systemic gender inequality. 8 6 Karima
Bennoune stresses that secularism is vital to the implementation of
women's human rights. In assessing the meaning of religious
garments and examining restrictions on them, Bennoune claims
that the importance of secularism for women's human rights must
be taken into account, as well as a more complex and contextual
understanding of the issues underlining the debate.187 She holds
rialism, especially in light of its colonial history).
184 See id. at 60 ("[B]oth religion and culture are asserted to justify the subordination of women for a whole range of reasons").
185 See Okin, supranote 156, at 18.
186
See Bennoune, supranote 3, at 367, 373-74 ("Keeping religious doctrine out
of law requires secularism, which must be recognized as a human rights value itself."). See also KHAWAR MUMTAZ & FARIDA SHAHEED, WOMEN OF PAKISTAN: Two
STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK? (1987) (discussing the women in Pakistan); Rashida Patel, Pakistan:Muslim Women and the Law, in EMPOWERMENT AND THE LAW:
STRATEGIES OF THIRD WORLD WOMEN 110 (Margaret Schuler ed., 1986) (discussing
women inequality in Pakistan); Nawal El Saadawi, The Political Challenges Facing
Arab Women at the End of the 20th Century (Marilyn Booth trans.), in WOMEN OF THE
ARAB WORLD: THE COMING CHALLENGE 10-11 (Nahid Toubia ed. & Nahed El
Gamal trans., 1988) (explaining the challenges faced by Arab women).
187 See Bennoune, supra note 3, at 369-71 (discussing the requirement that
women cover themselves as the result of introduction of religious fundamentalism into the realm of politics and law).
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that the ECtHR rulings were correctly decided. In her view, in a
reality where "religious contexts have become a serious challenge
to efforts to secure women's human rights," it is most crucial to
maintain secularism.'88 In discussing the bans on headscarves,
Bennoune goes as far as claiming that in order to protect women's
rights and to keep religion and law separated, secularism must be
recognized as a human rights value itself.189
Another aspect of this critique involves the question of the free
choice of women. It is very difficult to assess whether women
members of religious communities can genuinely express free
choice regarding their rights, or if they have enough power to convey their independent opinion. Women who are members of religious minority groups may be subject to internal pressures and often do not have a path to truly challenge their own communities,
or are too afraid to be perceived as betraying their own background, and as being disruptive to their community.190
Moreover, assessing the free choice of women, it is also very
important to give special consideration to cases involving religious
young girls. The debate over the Islamic headscarf involved cases
of schoolgirls wearing Islamic religious dress to primary and secondary schools, whether wearing only headscarves or more modest garments such as filbab (a dark cloak, long coat-like garment).191
It appears that this issue raises a double risk both in relations to
women's rights and children's rights. In this case, the free choice
to wear these garments is even more questionable when it comes to
young girls, and the concern over coercion is further exacerbated. 192 As expressed by Bennoune:
[w]omen and girls both may express themselves by wearing headscarves or other "modest" clothing, or they may
both be subject to coercion to do so. However, girls may be
18s See id. at 373 (citing U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan). See generally
U.N. Secretary-General, In-Depth Study on All Forms of Violence Against Women,
81, U.N. Doc. A/61/122/Add.1 (July 6, 2006).
189
See Bennoune, supra note 3, at 373-74 (arguing that secularism is fundamentally tied to the protection of human rights, particularly with respect to women).
190 See Chinkin, supra note 4, at 62 (making a similar point); see also, Okin, supra note 156, at 24 (arguing that older women often join voices reinforcing gender
inequality).
191 See, e.g., Dogru, supra note 8 (involving an eleven-year-old French Muslim
girl who had refused to take her headscarf off during physical education classes).
192 See supranote 150 and accompanying text.
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especially subject to pressure, including peer pressure, in
regards to dress, and need extra protection from religious
extremists and coercive family members.193
Furthermore, Judge Tulkens of the ECtHR based her argument
on the applicability of the ban on students, saying that as young
adults they are "less amenable to pressure," suggesting that
younger girls' free choice is uncertain.194
Secondly, justifications expressed in the name of allowing the
wearing of headscarf may seem irrelevant when it comes to young
girls - what kind of argument can be made to justify the covering
of girls' hair and bodies from modesty consideration? Is it also a
way for them to achieve true emancipation from society influences? It seems that many of the claims take on a ridiculous dimension when it comes to girls.
Notwithstanding the above analysis, the question still remains,
from a feminist perspective, as to when may the claim that adult
women freely choosel 95 to wear the Islamic headscarf be rejected?
Does women's free choice to practice religion as is truly stand in
contradiction with feminism? And finally, should a woman's religious freedom be accommodated by the law and under what
terms?
Christine Chinkin acknowledges all these difficulties and maintains that in order to resolve such conflicts of freedom of religion
and equality, a number of considerations must be taken into account that would reveal the interests involved in each controversy
over these issues, including who is claiming these rights, in what
context, and are women voices heard when these arguments are
made?196 She further claims that human rights are indivisible and
interdependent such that the consequences of claims made in the
name of the right to freedom of religion cannot be discussed in a
193
See Bennoune, supra note 3, at 406-07 (citing to an article by an Algerian
journalist Rachida Ziouche, who has asked, "[D]o you really believe a four-yearold is wearing the headscarf by choice?" Rachida Ziouche et al., Viewpoints: Eu-

rope

and

the

Headscarf,

BBC

NEws

(Feb.

10,

2004),

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3459963.stm#Rachida).
194
Sahin, supra note 1, at 220 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
195
See id. 1 12, at 48 (Judge Tulkens of the ECtHR in her dissenting opinion,
for instance, insists that Sahin acted on her free will and that nothing in the
Court's ruling suggests the opposite).
196
See Chinkin, supra note 4, at 61 ("The complex blend of religion, culture
and political power means that arguments that women's equality is subordinate
to religious requirements must be unpacked.").
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vacuum separated from other rights. 197
Ultimately, from this feminist perspective, it is argued that we
ought to be more protective of women's rights when norms and
practices of a religious group offend egalitarian ideas of equality
between men and women. Okin claims that "[i]n the case of a
more patriarchal minority culture in the context of a less patriarchal majority culture, no argument can be made on the basis of
self-respect or freedom that the female members of the culture
have a clear interest in its preservation."1 98 Offering a solution to
this conflict, Okin's strategy is to ensure representation of less
powerful members of minority groups in negotiations about group
rights and their interests, and to consult all parties involved.199
It is worth mentioning that these feminist critiques were followed by a wide range of responses of multicultural scholars
pointing at possible middle ground solutions, or at the danger in
these positions. Some offer recognition in only liberal cultures and
legitimizing only certain forms of group accommodations. 200 Another branch in the group rights theory argues that it is possible to
allow a group to prescribe norms even if they stand in contradiction to democratic values, if the individuals in the group are offered an option to "exit" the group (granting some form of relief
from the internal restrictions). 201 Others think that the feminist
perspective is intolerant and blind to cultural and religious differences, arguing that such an approach would lead to the extinction
of any culture or religion rejecting egalitarianism, 202 and respecting
Id.
See OIGN, supra note 156, at 22-23 (noting further that other considerations
would need to be taken in account such as whether the minority group "speaks a
language that requires protection" or whether the group is subject to prejudices
and racial discrimination).
197
198

199

Id.

See generally Karayanni, supra note 7, at 27; see also KYMUCKA, supra note
175, at 37 (1995) (arguing that "liberals can and should endorse certain external
protections, where they promote fairness between groups, but should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question and revise traditional authorities and practices").
201 See Karayanni, supra note 7, at 27-28 (noting the proposal that an opportunity to exit a group can be a potential solution which allows religious groups to
maintain their tenor while reconciling with more liberal values, but also discussing some of the complexities and difficulties in practice of this proposed solution).
2
See OKIN, supra note 156, at 22-23 (offering a positive answer, arguing that
women from patriarchal minority cultures "might be much better off if the culture
into which they were born were either to become extinct (so that its members
would become integrated into the less sexist surrounding culture) or, preferably,
200
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minorities only when they turn liberal. 203
Lastly, though not directly relevant to the headscarf debate,
while it seems in the context of this debate that the realization of
women's rights require the inevitable choice between these two
concepts (of secularism versus religion), other women (Muslim and
of other religious affiliation) envisioned a third way, where they
are pursuing religious freedom and equality within the context of
their religion, not just without it - the "religious feminists." 204 Religious feminists strive to make internal change within their religious communities, offering new, more equal religious practices
and interpretations, while embracing some of the existing traditions. Frances Raday explains that these women seek to realize
their rights through finding "a path to equal religious personhood." 205 Madhavi Sunder challenges the existing construction of
law (as will be discussed at length in the next chapter) that currently does not acknowledge these new religious activists, and claims
that under current law there is no individual right to contest cultural or religious norms from within. Thus, the inevitable result is
that the law requires women to choose between religion and
rights. 206
3. (THE ABSENCE OF) WOMEN RIGHTS IN THE REASONING OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
My inspiration for writing this paper came from a genuine conto be encouraged to alter itself so as to reinforce the equality of women.").
203 See Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 176, at 343 ("The danger is clearly that
such an approach would lead to respecting minority cultures only when they turn
liberal.") (citing Bhikhu Parekh, A Varied Moral World, in SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, Is
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 69 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds, 1999)).
204 See Sunder, supra note 10, at 1404 (claiming the rights of women seeking
equality within religion. Sunder presents a close study of women's human rights
activists working in Muslim communities and countries. She demonstrates that,
despite law's formal refusal to acknowledge their internal dissenting claims,
"women are nonetheless claiming their rights to challenge religious and cultural
authorities and to imagine religious community on more egalitarian and democratic terms.").
205 Frances Raday, Claiming Equal Religious Personhood:Women of the Wall's
Constitutional Saga, in RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE: A CoMPARATIvE ANALYSIS OF
GERMAN, ISRAELI, AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 255, 256 (Winfried Brugger
& Michael Karayanni eds., 2007) (claiming that women members of traditionalist
cultural or religious communities seek to achieve equal personhood within their
community).
206 See Sunder, supra note 10, at 1410 (arguing that "[d]issenters have no right
to stay within their communities and contest or reform them.").
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cern about what I felt was the lack of jurisprudence in the field of
religion and State in general, and more specifically women's religious freedoms and rights.
However, I was struck by the scale of the problem. The research on these issues unveiled a worldwide phenomenon relevant
in many states and different jurisprudences. For example, though
this paper does not look at states' jurisprudence, it is worth mentioning that the UK House of Lords, guided by the ECtHR decisions, had also upheld a prohibition of a public school on the wearing of a jilbab (described as long coat-like dress). What was
seriously troubling in this ruling was Lord Bingham's leading
opinion according to which the decision did not "and could not...
rule whether Islamic dress, or any feature of Islamic dress, should
or should not be permitted in the schools of this country." 207 He
stressed that such a decision "would be a most inappropriate question for the House in its judicial capacity." 208 Not only that, Lord
Bingham further held it would be "irresponsible of any court, lacking the experience, background and detailed knowledge of the
head teacher, staff and governors, to overrule their judgment on a
matter as sensitive as this."209 It must also be noted that although
guided by Sahin, the judge did not refer in any way to gender
equality nor women's rights. 210 Yet, in what or how this administrative decision of school authorities is different from any other decision that it deserves such a unique status of an 'untouchable'
matter by the House of Lords, is simply not addressed. As will be
discussed henceforth, this creation of an "extralegal" field is only
207 Begum, supra note 59,
2; also cited by Chinkin, supra note 4, at 72.
Begum, a fourteen-year-old British Muslim schoolgirl, wore the jilbab in violation
of the school's dress code.
208

Begum T 2.

34.
Id. In this regard, a dissenting opinion in the Begum case authored by
Baroness Hale referred to the issue. While agreeing with the result, Baroness
Hale's opinion attempts to provide a more extensive analysis of the gender-based
considerations that should have been taken into account by the Court. Unlike the
majority's opinion, Baroness Hale held that Begum's right to manifest her religion
was indeed infringed. However, in her view, the interference was justified, especially in light of the girl's young age and in consideration of actions taken by the
school. These actions reflected a proportionate response respecting cultural and
religious diversity to some extent (e.g. by allowing girls to wear the less veiling
93-98.
religious garment, the hijab). Id.
209
210

Id.
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part of the special unjustified construction of religion and state issues at the intersection with gender equality in law.
Nevertheless, it was most surprising and unfortunate to discover, as an international law and human rights practitioner, that
the very much appreciated and respected European Court of Human Rights has also failed to develop a legal methodology to address women rights in the religious context. As stated and demonstrated previously, the Court did not elaborate in any of its
statements about the inherent and complex conflict of gender
equality and religious freedoms, and merely stated that the wearing of headscarf is "difficult to reconcile" with the principle of
gender equality. 211 Regrettably, the Court preferred to make use of
the Margin of Appreciation doctrine to deem questions of religious
aspirations of women as not fitting to its supervision and oversight.
These observations are extremely concerning especially in light
of the special status the Court enjoys worldwide as a source of inspiration which resonate in numerous international and national
decisions concerning human rights issues. 212
As demonstrated in the previous section, there are certainly
heavy feminist arguments from both those who criticize the wearing of the headscarf as an oppressive practice and therefore encourage restrictions on it, and those who oppose such restrictions.
Regrettably, the ECtHR ignored both. Opening this paper is the
quote of ECtHR Judge Tulkens from her powerful minority opinion in the case of Sahin asking "what, in fact, is the connection between the ban and sexual equality? The judgment does not
say." 213 She further continues to denunciate the Court's ruling and
refers to it as "general and abstract." 21 4 Tulkens mentions that the
Court could have applied the extensive case law of the ECtHR on
the right to personal autonomy on the basis of Article 8 of the European Convention, and points out to a long list of cases. 215 Her re-

Dahlab,supra note 8, at 462.
See Benvenisti, supra note 12, at 843 (describing the Court's influence and
tendency for praise).
213
Sahin, supra note 1, 11 at 48 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
214 Id. 12, at 48.
215 See Sahin, supra note 1, 12, at 48 (Tulkens, J., dissenting) (referring to Keenan v. United Kingdom, No. 27229/95, § 92, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001-III; Pretty v. United Kingdom, No. 2346/02, §§ 65-67, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2002-III; and Christine Goodwin
v. United Kingdom, No. 28957/95, § 90, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2002-VI).
211

212
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flection on the Court's decision leads her to conclude that "what is
lacking in this debate is the opinion of women, both those who
wear the headscarf and those who choose not to." 21 6 As detailed
previously in this paper, other feminists have expressed similar critiques on the Court's judgment.
Therefore, it seems that the Court failed, or wished to avoid,
dealing with the complexity of this debate. Christine Chinkin mentions only a few of the considerations that should be taken into
consideration when confronting claims that women's equality is
subordinate to religious requirements:
Searching questions should be asked such as: who is making the particular argument, for what reason, in what context and with what objectives? Are claims based on religion
being used as a justification for maintaining existing power
structures [between men and women- C.E.L]? Are women
voices heard when such claims are determined? Or is it the
voices of male elites, whether religious or political leaders,
that predominate? Does a majority community essentialise
minority communities by taking account of the views only
of its male members thereby silencing other voices, including those of women? 217
In addition, underlying the Court's approach in these cases is
the notion that the decisions made by the national authorities in
those issues must be given special importance. 218 In the cases of
Sahin and Dogru, the Court went even one step further (compared
to Dahlab),219 and held that the width of the margin of appreciation
is even greater than usual where questions concerning the relationship between State and religions are at stake, since opinion on religion and the values of a democratic society may reasonably differ
widely. 220 Judge Tulkens specifically criticizes the ample manner
in which the Court chose to apply the margin of appreciation doctrine, practically granting states full discretion to decide these is-

Id. 11, at 48.
Chinkin, supra note 4, at 61.
218 See Sahin, supra note 1,
109, at 28 (showing the uniqueness of the preceding cases).
219
See Evans, supra note 4, at 57 (emphasizing that while the margin was only briefly mentioned in the Dahlab, supra note 8 decision, it was of great significance in Sahin, supranote 1).
220 Id.; Dogru, supra note 8, 163, at 17.
216
217
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sues, while abandoning the necessary European supervision. 221
Evans stresses in this regard that the oversight by the Court has
lessened significantly by the development of the concept of the
margin of appreciation, and notes that in Sahin it led the Court in
what could be seen as deference to state authorities. 22 2
No doubt, the adoption of a broad legal concept subordinating
the Court to states' discretion when religious questions arise,
comes at the expense of elaborating a human rights based approach to these cases. Moreover, stating the broad influence of the
ECtHR jurisprudence, Eyal Benvenisti expresses a genuine concern
for the future of universal aspirations for the protection of human
rights, in light of the ECtHR use of the margin of appreciation doctrine in its jurisprudence.2 B Benvenisti argues that universal human rights standards are largely compromised by the doctrine of
margin of appreciation. The notion that each society is entitled to
certain latitude in resolving internal human rights conflicts, promoting moral relativism, stands at odds with the concept of universal human rights. 224 He further argues that the doctrine seriously undermines the promise of international enforcement of human
rights that overcomes national considerations, and obstructs the
external supervision required to ensure guarantees against human
rights violation. 225 Benvenisti claims that the greatest danger in the
wide margin of appreciation is for minorities who rely upon the
judicial process to secure their rights among the majority population. Especially precious to them are international judicial tribunal
and monitoring organs that are often their last resort. These arguments are most relevant to the three cases analyzed in this paper.
221 Sahin, supra note 1,
2, 9, 12, at 44, 47-48 (Tulkens, J., dissenting)
(Tulkens suggests that it has not always shown the same judicial restraint when
required to settle conflicts between religious communities. Tulkens specifically
notes the extensive case-law on freedom of expression and the possibility to use
the current case-law developed regarding the right to personal autonomy). She
expresses her concern on the 'thin' European supervision of the Court stating that
it "seems quite simply to be absent from the judgment," while in her view "European supervision cannot ... be escaped simply by invoking the margin of appreciation." Sahin, supra note 1, 3, at 44.
222 See Evans, supra note 4, at 57 (making the argument for deference to state
legislature).
223 See Benvenisti, supra note 12, at 843 (elaborating on the relationship between the margin of appreciation doctrine and human rights protection).
224 Id. at 843-44.
225 Id. (pointing at the weakness of national institutions and the danger of

entrusting them with supervision of human rights law, to such a large extent).
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Turning to find explanations for the Court's approach, it is not
very clear what underlies the Court's inability to engage in a more
serious and vigorous discussion on human rights. One possibility
for the avoidance of confronting questions of religion in the legal
sphere, let alone with women and religion, might be that such restraint is essential to social and political stability of the Court and
other judicial systems, as well as derived from the interest to keep
a certain public order that prefers that such decisions be made by
other authorities.
Since this is a feminist paper, it should also be noted that another argument is made blaming the lack of consideration of women's religious liberties on the male-dominated legal process and
rulings. 226 Although supporting the ECtHR decisions regarding
the bans, Karima Bennoune mentions with regret that only few
women were given voice in the debate, while the majority of the
judges, lawyers and advisers were male.227 Evans expresses a similar concern, stressing that the ECtHR is a male-dominated Court
and in the case of Sahin [the Grand Chamber], there were 12 male
judges and five female judges of whom one dissented.228
Notwithstanding these arguments, this paper argues that, following Madhavi Sunder's inspiring article, "Piercing the Veil", that
a deeper, much more stressing, problem is involved. It seems that
the leading motif in between the lines of the ECtHR decisions, and
other legal institutions, is the construction of religion as law's "other".229 In simple words, the construction of religion as law's "other" relates to the legal understanding of religion as so irrational
and distinct from law that it is simply 'unsuitable' for law and in-

226 See Evans, supra note 4, at 67 (expressing a discrepancy between the law
as seen by men and a focus on women's rights).
2
See Bennoune, supra note 3, at 423. ("It is regrettable that few women are
even given voice in the debate. Seven ECtHR judges ruled in Sahin in the Fourth
Section judgment [the lower instance that considered the case - C.E.L]; six were
men. All of Ms. Sahin's lawyers and advisers at both levels were male. Oral argument in the Grand Chamber was made only by male advocates on either side of
the issue .... This is not to disqualify male voices, but to hope rather that women
of diverse views are more empowered in the discussion.").
228 Id. at 67. See generally HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 4 (2000) (drawing attention to the male dominance in the creation of international law and its application
and indicating that the absence of women in the development of international law
has produced a narrow and inadequate jurisprudence that has, among other
things, legitimated the unequal position of women).
229 Sunder, supra note 11, at 1417.
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capable of being tested or judged.23
Sunder generally refers to the construction of religion in international law and explores how it influences women human rights.
However, I further claim it is not only that religion is constructed
as law's "other", but that in the context of women rights and religion, religion's 'otherness' is even more exacerbated.
This notion takes many forms in judicial decisions 231 and legal
theories, but generally it is the claim that legal demands involving
religion and women's rights create a legal field so 'sensitive', distinct, controversial and different, it should just be generally avoided. Usually, cases involving women's rights and religion are left or
referred by courts to be debated by other authorities, mainly in the
political sphere. In addition, as Sunder's puts it, in our reality religion has become an "extralegal field" pushed to the private
sphere. 232
To better understand the origin of religion construction as
law's "other", scholars go back to the historical background of international law. 233 David Kennedy suggests that religion is something we "used to have" in the far past of constructions of international law, and offers an historical understanding of the current
construction of law.23 4 According to Kennedy, international law
has emerged from the ruins of the Holy Roman Empire, and is
commonly dated from the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Coming after and as a result to religious wars, international law is seen as a
response to inadequacies of religion. 235 Thus, the exclusion of religion, established as an extralegal field from the very beginning of

23 See also Sunder, supra note 10, at 1417-19 (highlighting the incompatibility
of law and religion).
231 For example, in the context of the ECtHR, I claim that it take the form of
the wide margin of appreciation which constructs religion as "other".
232 See Sunder, supra note 10, at 1417; also citing Kennedy, Images of Religion
in International Legal Theory, supra note 10, at 149; see also Cema & Wallace, supra
note 10, at 646 (emphasizing that "states have used this distinction [between public and private] to the disadvantage of women by asserting that certain harmful
practices are cultural traditions, and thus outside of the realm of human rights
law").

m See generally Kennedy, Images of Religion in InternationalLegal Theory, supra
note 10, at 145-46; Sunder, supra note 10, at 1415.
23
Kennedy, Images of Religion in International Legal Theory, supra note 10, at
145. Sunder refers to it as the "Law's 'Past'." Sunder, supranote 10, at 1415.
235 Kennedy, Images of Religion in International Legal Theory, supra note 10, at
146-47.
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the law of nations, is understandable. 236 Seeking a clear break from
the past, religion was constructed as law's "other". 237
Sunder argues that this conception of religion, as distinct from
public fields of law and later of science, further contributed to the
belief that religion was not premised upon reason and thus could
not be tested, challenged or questioned (unlike science). 238 Religion's irrationality and spirituality made it "unsuitable for law". 239
It seems that the judicial restraint from confronting religion,
and more specifically women's rights and religion, finds its traces
in the European Court of Human Rights rulings in the cases discussed herein on the debate over the Islamic religious dress. Leaving a broad space for other authorities to fill-in the analytical and
conceptual gaps created in questions involving religion, is only one
aspect of the Court's construction of religion as the law's "other" in
issues involving women's human rights.
Reflecting on the Court's unwillingness to provide a more
thorough, inclusive and persuasive analysis, it appears its aim was
to avoid in-depth examination of religion. The meaning of religion
in people's and women's lives, the origin of religious practices, religious aspirations or lack of such, the different interpretations of
religion conducts, women religious liberties and equality, all of
these are only part of what the Court missed and is deemed to consider and reckon in its future judgments.
The Court's role is, at the very least, to understand and unpack
religious endeavors, and discuss their implications on women's
human rights or other contested considerations, such as state neutrality, equality and secularism.
For the Court to assume its proper role, it must confront all aspects involving these cases and develop a legal methodology, as
well as legal tests to unveil the true story of women liberties and
religion. It is in this context that Sunder offers to replace the traditional theories of religion and law, which are viewing religion as a
sphere of injustice, and which hold religious beliefs to be unchanging, with contemporary theories. 240 These new theories argue that
"religion is much more internally contested and subject to rea236 See Kennedy, Images of Religion in International Legal Theory, supra note 10,
at 149 (noting the initial separation of religion from international law).
237 Sunder, supra note 10, at 1417.
23
Id. at 1418.
239 Id.
20 Sunder, supra note 10, at 1423.
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soned argument and change" than previously acknowledged. 24 1
Sunder argues that a key to understanding this new notion of religion as mutable is the observation that while the subject matter of
religion is spiritual, it is human beings who interpret it to their
lives. 24 2 Thus, these human aspects of religion can be subject to
some level of rational and legitimate judicial review. 243 As articulated by Bhikhu Parekh, "Religion does involve faith, but it is not a
matter of faith alone, which is why the two should not be equated.
It involves judgment, choice and decision, and hence reason and
personal responsibility."244
Finally, concurrently, the Court's approach seriously endangers
women's human rights, as well as rights of other minorities or other individuals influenced by claims made in the name of religion or
religious aspirations. As expressed by Sunder, truly securing human rights requires a brave deconstruction of religion. Therefore,
the Court must identify that part of religion that is human or legal
construction, and thus requires justification and accountability. 24 5
As simply put by Sunder, "human rights law, not religion, is the
problem." 246 Accordingly, the solution lies at the hands of the ECtHR and other courts around the world. Certainly, such an assessment of religion and human rights issues should be only expected by a secular legal system.
In the case of the ECtHR, a special consideration must be made
to its most influential jurisprudence, and the extent to which its
rulings are applied worldwide. Numerous domestic institutions
and courts (across Europe and beyond it) reach their judgments re241

Id.; see also TALAL

ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS

27, 236 (1993) ("Religious traditions have undergone the most radical transformations over time.").
242
See Sunder, supra note 10, at 1423 (noting that religion and rationality
need not be mutually exclusive).
243 See id. at 1423 n.116 (showing that religious beliefs can be scrutinized in a
similar fashion as law). Sunder also quotes Bhikhu Parekh who writes that "[t]he
divine will is a matter of human definition and interpretation, and requires [human beings] to show why they interpret their religion in one way rather than another and why they think that their interpretation entails a particular form of behavior .... No religion is or can be wholly divine in the sense of being altogether
free of human mediation. Its origin and inspiration are divine but human beings
determine its meaning and content." Id.
OF POWER IN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM

244 BHIKHU PAREKH, RETHINKING MULTICULTURALISM: CULTURAL DIVERSITY
AND POLITICAL THEORY 334-35 (2000).
245 See Sunder, supra note 10, at 1404 (arguing that human-constructed aspects
of religion should be given legal scrutiny).
246 Id. at 1403.
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lying on ECtHR jurisprudence, but not just them. 247 This jurisprudence aspire prominent international human rights tribunals,
judges and members of U.N human rights organs, and international institutions.248
Thus, for the Court to truly rise to these challenges and assume
its role in the international human rights level, it must take a brave
position and confront these complex issues, albeit with due legal
sensitivity. This would involve, as an alternative, the elaboration
of an extensive coherent legal framework, utilizing to its fullest extent international human rights theories, tests and analytical tools
that have been applied by the ECtHR in other cases.
CONCLUSION

To conclude, the ECtHR's extremely cautious approach, when
required to confront the conflict of gender equality and religious
liberties, is reflected in its most recent jurisprudence explored in
this paper.
Arguably, this approach, while presumably achieving ad-hoc
solutions, ultimately fails to address, much less advance, the substantive issue of women's rights and religion. The Court appears
to have abdicated its interpretative potential, and its role in providing vigorous legal analysis of human rights law, to assume the
more modest role of generating acceptable middle-ground rulings.
This article advances the argument that the ECtHR position
stems from its view of religion as a distinct and irrational discipline, unsuitable for legal judgment. Such an approach is particularly dangerous in light of the court's most influential jurisprudence and the extent to which its rulings are applied worldwide.
Ultimately, the decisions made in the name of human rights have a
potentially devastating effect on women's rights, religious freedoms, and equality.
In the era of multiculturalism and globalization, awareness to
such risks is fundamental to the development of modem society
and role that international human rights tribunals play in this
complex ecosystem.
247 See generally Benvenisti, supra note 12; Eyal Benvenisti, National Courts and
the International Law on Minority Rights, 2 AusnUAN REV. INT'L & EuR. L. 1 (1997);
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L.

REV. 99 (1994).
248 See Benvenisti, supra note 12, at 843 (noting the immense influence of ECtHR jurisprudence).
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